The work of a diplomat.
Four periods, 23 stories, and the documents behind them.
23 stories in four periods. Choose a moment: each story has its own page, historical context and sources.
1954–1966
The young diplomat
London, Washington and Jerusalem: quiet channels, arms and security
- 1954 · London
The southern periphery: contacts with Sudan
In London in 1954 Gazit met secretly with Sudanese representatives, in one of Israel’s first attempts to break the isolation around it.
3 min read - 28 January 1959 · Jerusalem
Organizing knowledge to share abroad
In 1959 Gazit proposed to Golda Meir a way to organize technical assistance abroad: experts, needs and coordination across government.
1 min read - 8 May 1959 · Jerusalem
Protecting the route through Poland
In May 1959 Gazit coordinated requests for voluntary press restraint to protect a possible emigration route from the Soviet Union through Poland.
1 min read - Spring 1961 · Washington
The first visit to the Dimona reactor
In 1961, from the Washington embassy, Gazit coordinated the first visit of American scientists to the Dimona reactor.
2 min read - 1961–1962 · Washington
Security assurances and the Hawk talks
At the Washington embassy, beside Ambassador Harman, Gazit negotiated with the Americans on the Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, the first advanced weapons the United States sold Israel, and put forward his own idea for a presidential guarantee.
2 min read - 1966, 1978 · Jerusalem and Paris
Understanding the relationship with Iran
As head of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East department, Gazit analysed the quiet tie with the Shah’s Iran in 1966, and spoke with its prime minister.
1 min read
1967–1972
Between the wars
A united Jerusalem, the Jarring mission, the Suez Canal and the secret channel to Moscow
- 1962–1974 · Washington and Jerusalem
Thinking about Jerusalem, with Teddy Kollek
In July 1968 the “boroughs plan” for Jerusalem was raised at a gathering Gazit initiated, or, in another study’s account, in a group of senior officials set up by Teddy Kollek and chaired by him. In 1974 the working paper on the holy places reached his office.
3 min read - 1970–1971 · Jerusalem
The Jarring file: his testimony in retrospect
At the end of 1970, at Golda Meir’s request, Gazit coordinated the teams preparing Israel for negotiations, and was in charge of the Jarring file.
4 min read - 1970–1971
Facing the American embassy
Between the wars, as the Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Director-General for North American affairs, Gazit was the man facing the American embassy: he received its positions, clarified them and guarded Israel’s interest in the details.
2 min read - 21 October 1971 · Jerusalem
A near-verbatim record
In October 1971 Gazit sat beside Foreign Minister Eban at the meeting where the American interim-settlement initiative was presented, and recorded it almost word for word.
2 min read - 1971–1975
A confidential channel to Moscow
Gazit led the Israeli side in the secret channel to Moscow: he sat across from the Soviet envoys, Yevgeny Primakov among them, and reported directly to Golda Meir.
3 min read
1973–1974
The war and disengagement
From Golda Meir’s office: Hussein, the cables, the White House, the drafts
- 25 September 1973 · The Mossad facility at Glilot
At the table with King Hussein
Eleven days before the war Gazit, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and her political adviser, sat beside Golda Meir at the secret meeting with King Hussein, and kept the record.
3 min read - 5–30 October 1973 · Jerusalem and Tel Aviv
Between Jerusalem and Washington: the war
Throughout the Yom Kippur War Gazit ran the cable line between Jerusalem and Washington: front reports, arms requests and messages to Kissinger.
10 min read - 22 October 1973 · Herzliya
A garbled message, on the day of the ceasefire
At the meeting with Kissinger in Herzliya, on the day the ceasefire took effect, Gazit made sure a garbled American message was cleared up.
1 min read - 1–2 November 1973 · Washington
With Golda in the Oval Office
In November 1973 Gazit sat beside Golda Meir in the Washington talks and in the Oval Office, kept the record, and proposed to Kissinger a practical formula for the exchange of prisoners.
3 min read - December 1973 · Jerusalem
Before the Geneva Conference: the practical questions
Ahead of the Geneva Conference, in December 1973, Gazit coordinated the expert teams preparing a “menu” of options on every subject for the government, and in the discussion with Kissinger raised the practical questions: supervision, distances and the depth of the zones between the forces.
3 min read - 15 January 1974 · Jerusalem
Between the hot soup and the next draft
In January 1974, around the working table with Kissinger, Gazit was the one revising the draft of the first disengagement agreement with Egypt.
2 min read - 26 March 1974 · Jerusalem
A staff for national-security decisions
In March 1974 Gazit submitted to Golda Meir a proposal for a small staff to help the Prime Minister assess information and policy alternatives.
1 min read - 28 May 1974 · Jerusalem
Toward the decision on the Syrian agreement
In the negotiations on the disengagement agreement with Syria, in May 1974, Gazit was one of the key people of the Prime Minister’s Office: he sat in the decisive discussion with Kissinger, ran the cables to Washington, and represented Israel at the signing in Geneva.
3 min read
1974–1979
The agreement with Egypt, and Paris
Alongside Rabin, in Geneva, then ambassador in France
- 1974–1975 · The White House
Alongside Rabin at the White House
Under Rabin too, Gazit remained Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and his political adviser, and sat beside him in the meetings with President Ford in 1974 and 1975.
3 min read - March 1975 · Jerusalem
“Too sensible”: in Kissinger’s shuttle
In Kissinger’s shuttle of March 1975 Gazit was the one holding the texts and the facts for the Israeli team.
4 min read - September 1975 · Geneva
The signing in Geneva: an agreement with Egypt
On 4 September 1975 Gazit signed the interim agreement with Egypt on Israel’s behalf.
2 min read - 1976–1979 · Paris
Ambassador in Paris: three crises
As ambassador in Paris, 1976–1979, Gazit steered Israel’s relations with France through three crises: Entebbe, Abu Daoud and the Iraqi reactor.
3 min read
People, sources and further reading
Who’s who in these pages14
Roles are given as they were at the time. Links lead to the moments where each person appears.
- Golda Meir
- Prime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.Wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.The Jarring file, 1970–1971The meeting with Hussein, 1973The war, 1973With Golda in the Oval Office, 1973
- Yitzhak Rabin
- Prime Minister, 1974–1977; earlier Deputy Chief of Staff and ambassador in Washington.Wanted: To move step by step, through interim agreements, in return for American guarantees and arms.Alongside Rabin at the White House, 1974–1975“Too sensible”, 1975
- Yigal Allon
- Deputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister in Rabin’s government.Wanted: Defensible borders, and a territorial compromise with Jordan (the “Allon Plan”).The decision on the Syrian agreement, 1974“Too sensible”, 1975
- Abba Eban
- Foreign Minister, 1966–1974.Wanted: To present Israel to the world as a country seeking peace, and to win support for it.Taken down almost word for word, 1971The Jarring file, 1970–1971
- Simcha Dinitz
- Israel’s ambassador in Washington from 1973.Wanted: American arms and support, during the war and after it.The war, 1973With Golda in the Oval Office, 1973“Too sensible”, 1975
- Aharon Yariv
- Major General, former head of Military Intelligence and adviser to the Prime Minister.Wanted: To use the ceasefire for direct military talks with Egypt, at Kilometre 101.With Golda in the Oval Office, 1973
- Meir Rosenne
- Legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry.Wanted: Precise legal texts that leave no opening for readings against Israel.“Too sensible”, 1975
- Henry Kissinger
- U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.Wanted: To push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and make the United States the only broker, through step-by-step agreements.A garbled message on ceasefire day, 1973Between the hot soup and the next draft, 1974“Too sensible”, 1975
- Joseph Sisco
- Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, the senior State Department official responsible for the region.Wanted: To advance the American initiatives and bridge the parties’ positions.“Too sensible”, 1975
- Harold Saunders
- U.S. National Security Council staff, the White House body that advises the president on foreign and security affairs.Wanted: To prepare texts and options for Kissinger’s negotiations.Between the hot soup and the next draft, 1974
- Ismail Fahmy
- Egypt’s Foreign Minister.Wanted: An Israeli withdrawal from Sinai through American mediation, without paying with full recognition.“Too sensible”, 1975
- Anwar Sadat
- President of Egypt, 1970–1981.Wanted: To get Sinai back for Egypt, and move Egypt from Soviet to American patronage.Taken down almost word for word, 1971The interim agreement, 1975
- Richard Nixon
- President of the United States, 1969–1974.Wanted: Stability in the Middle East and a check on Soviet influence, without a direct clash between the powers.With Golda in the Oval Office, 1973
- Gerald Ford
- President of the United States, 1974–1977.Wanted: To continue Kissinger’s path: a second interim agreement between Israel and Egypt.Alongside Rabin at the White House, 1974–1975