Historical context and questions to explore
Herzliya, 22 October 1973. Kissinger lands straight from Moscow, hours after the Security Council called for a ceasefire in Resolution 338. On the southern front the fighting is still raging, and every hour redraws the map.
The IDF had crossed the canal and was threatening to encircle Egypt’s Third Army. The ceasefire was violated, fighting continued, and the superpowers edged towards direct confrontation.
Why it mattered. In days like these, a garbled word in a cable could change a decision. The quiet, seemingly technical checking was part of what prevented misunderstandings at hours when any misunderstanding could cost dearly.
A question to think about
How do you make sure, in the middle of a war, that what was said in Washington is what was understood in Jerusalem?
Why it was hard. Messages flew between Washington, Moscow, Cairo and Jerusalem; a single misunderstanding of wording or timing could change the course of events.
His part: At the meeting with Kissinger in Herzliya, on the day the ceasefire took effect, Gazit made sure a garbled American message was cleared up.
In Herzliya, on the day the ceasefire took effect, Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” → and her team sat with Henry KissingerU.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.What they wanted: To push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and make the United States the only broker, through step-by-step agreements.More on Henry Kissinger in “People and events” →. In the conversation, Gazit made clear that an American message had reached Israel garbled. This too was part of his work in those days: making sure both sides were talking about the same text before arguing over its substance.Diplomatic record
Explore the documents and connections
“We did but it was garbled.”- The questionKissinger asks whether his message arrived.
- The clarificationGazit explains how Israel understood it.
- The workMaking a misunderstanding explicit, during a crisis.
Sources and reading notes (1)
- Diplomatic Records[D1] Meir and Kissinger, 22 October 1973 ↗
FRUS, Volume XXV, Document 230. Memorandum.