Mordechai GazitIn memory · 1922‎–‎2016 — Home page
עברית · קריאת העמוד בעברית
A closer look / Washington, 1962‎–‎1965

The work between the headlines.

A cemetery, water, security assurances and a tense border. Four contemporary American records bring us closer to Gazit’s day-to-day work as minister at Israel’s embassy.

The story in brief

From 1960 to 1965 Gazit served as minister at Israel’s embassy in Washington, deputy to Ambassador Avraham Harman. The Hawk missile sale and American visits to Dimona were negotiated in those years. The four records here follow other matters on his desk: the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, Jordan waters, security guarantees and tensions along the Jordanian border.

In 1962 he asked for answers within a week about roadworks on the Mount of Olives. In 1963 he proposed approaching Yugoslavia to influence plans for a dam in Jordan. Read the American replies too: sometimes officials agreed to investigate, sometimes they objected. The memoranda let us follow the exchanges without assuming that every request produced an outcome.

FRUS is the US State Department’s published diplomatic record. These accounts preserve the American officials’ perspective, rather than word-for-word transcripts.

31 May 1962

The Mount of Olives, from Washington

How can diplomacy help protect a place of remembrance?

Historical context and questions to explore

For nineteen years, from 1948 to 1967, the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the oldest and most important in the world, lay across the line, in Jordanian territory. Jews were not allowed to reach it, and in the early 1960s a road to a new hotel was cut through it.

Israel and Jordan had no relations, so Israel could not approach Jordan directly; the only way to exert influence was through the United States, which had ties with both.

Why it mattered. Generations of Jewish sages and leaders are buried on the Mount, from the Second Temple period to modern times. The appeal from Washington shows an Israeli diplomat trying to protect a place of Jewish memory through a foreign power, when every direct door was closed. Only after 1967 did it become clear how badly the site had been damaged.

A question to think about

How do you persuade a superpower to spend its influence on a matter it thinks minor, and get an answer in time?

Why it was hard. For Israel it was a matter of honouring the dead and of historical attachment; for Jordan, of development and sovereignty. Washington did not want to be drawn into a local dispute.

A hotel access road on the Mount of Olives prompted Gazit to approach the State Department. The American cable records his argument that the road could avoid damaging the Jewish cemetery, and his request for clarification from Jordan about the work and future plans.

Gazit sought answers within a week and intervention to stop the work if those answers caused concern. The American official acknowledged the concern but favoured quiet diplomacy over ultimatums. The record adds the protection of a place of remembrance to the security issues of his Washington work.

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10 October 1963

Maqarin dam: an approach through Yugoslavia

How could an engineering assessment serve a diplomatic argument?

On 10 October 1963, Gazit returned to his earlier personal suggestion, now backed in Jerusalem: Washington should approach Yugoslavia to influence the firm surveying Jordan’s planned Maqarin dam. A finding that storage above 300 million cubic metres was uneconomic could help Jordan justify a smaller dam to other Arab states. Jernegan undertook to examine the approach; the record gives no outcome.

The economic argument was intended to help Jordan justify a smaller dam to other Arab states. The Americans considered suggesting that Jordan ask the Yugoslav firm for cost estimates at several sizes, noting that international finance depended on viability. Water allocations, engineering and finance were being discussed together with a diplomatic question: what argument could the other side accept?

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  • Diplomatic Documents[WATER63] Jordan waters: the Maqarin proposal, 1963 ↗

    FRUS, 1961‎–‎1963, vol. XVIII, document 338. Conversation of 10 October 1963, drafted by Crawford on 14 October; relevant passage, pp. 734–735. Department of State, Central Files, POL 33–1 ISR–JORDAN

14 November 1963

Alongside Rabin: what comes next?

How can assurances of support become practical security?

Historical context and questions to explore

In the early 1960s Egypt was arming with Soviet weapons, and German scientists were helping it develop missiles. Fear grew in Israel, and Jerusalem kept asking one question: would the United States stand by Israel when it counted?

On 14 November 1963 , then Deputy Chief of Staff, and Gazit met of the White House’s National Security Council. Eight days later was assassinated.

Why it mattered. In the decade that followed, Washington became Israel’s most important ally. Meetings like this one, where Gazit and Rabin tried to move from voicing concern to asking what to do, were part of the road there. Rabin would later be ambassador in Washington and prime minister.

A question to think about

How do you present Israel’s security needs in a language a sceptical administration can accept?

Why it was hard. Washington judged the threat to be more limited and feared that more weapons would accelerate the arms race; Israel saw an existential threat.

Gazit joined and Major Ron in talks with . The conversation turned into a disagreement about the scale of the military threat and the response it required. Gazit said, in Komer’s account, Israel trusted the United States but needed stronger guarantees or greater deterrent strength.

The memorandum also attributes to Gazit a determination to acquire missiles. warned of an escalating arms race. At the close, Gazit pressed for a practical next step after the exchange of assessments.

From the same year: signing the Test Ban Treaty for Israel, 1963

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8 June 1965

A channel of messages to King Hussein

What could a Washington conversation do for a troubled border?

Historical context and questions to explore

1965. A new Palestinian organisation, Fatah, begins operating against Israel, its squads often setting out from Jordanian territory. Israel responds with reprisal raids, and the long border with Jordan grows hotter.

did not want war but struggled to restrain the raids. Israel and Jordan had no relations, and messages passed through third parties.

Why it mattered. Tension on the Jordanian border in 1965‎–‎1967 was one of the factors that led to the Six-Day War, in which the West Bank and East Jerusalem came under Israeli control. Even then, when Israel and Jordan had no relations at all, an indirect channel to King Hussein was kept open through Washington. It was the beginning of a relationship that lasted decades and led, in 1994, to a peace treaty.

A question to think about

How do you lower tension with a king you have no relations with, through an American go-between, without every message sounding like a threat?

Why it was hard. Israel wanted to make clear that it would respond, while signalling that it did not seek escalation. An indirect message could be read as a threat or as weakness.

Gazit conveyed Israel’s stated wish to restore quiet along its borders and cooperate with the Jordanian authorities. Alongside concerns about infiltration and attacks, he asked the Americans to continue passing messages to and thanked them for transmitting information on Israel’s behalf.

State Department official Rodger Davies stressed ’s efforts and the limits of his ability to prevent infiltration. He warned that further Israeli raids could provoke a Jordanian military response. The exchange shows the everyday work of diplomacy: messages, clarification and efforts to prevent escalation.

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