His part: Eleven days before the war Gazit, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and her political adviser, sat beside Golda Meir at the secret meeting with King Hussein, and kept the record.
Historical background
Since the 1960s King Hussein had met Israel’s leaders in secret, though Jordan and Israel were officially enemies. In September 1973 he came back from a meeting with the presidents of Egypt and Syria worried: a new war could drag his kingdom in.
He asked for an urgent meeting with Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” →. On 25 September he flew in by helicopter, to a facility of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, at Glilot.
Why it mattered. An Arab king sitting across from Israel’s prime minister, telling her about the Syrian army’s deployment: whether this was a warning, and whether it was missed, is one of the most painful questions in the country’s history.
A question to think about
How do you record a sensitive conversation exactly, when any word in it may later prove decisive, and there is no knowing yet which?
Why it was hard. Israeli intelligence assessed that Syria would not attack without Egypt, and that Egypt was not ready for war. The King’s words were heard against that assessment, and whether they amounted to a real warning is disputed to this day.
On the evening of 25 September 1973, at his urgent request, King HusseinKing of Jordan, 1952–1999.What they wanted: To keep his kingdom safe between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians, and to regain the West Bank.More on King Hussein in “People and events” → of Jordan came to a secret meeting with Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” → at a Mossad facility near Tel Aviv. Beside Meir sat Gazit, Director-General of her office and her political adviser, who recorded the main points for the Israeli side.
The secret meetings with the King were not discussed in the full cabinet, only in “Golda’s kitchen”, the small forum of the Prime Minister and her senior ministers; Jordan’s Prime Minister, Zaid al-Rifai, took notes for the Jordanian side. Meir’s aide Lou Kedar was also in the room. The conversation lasted about three hours.
Towards the end, the King reported, from a very good source, that Syrian forces were deployed in attack positions under cover of an exercise. Meir asked whether it was conceivable that the Syrians would act without full cooperation from Egypt; the King replied that he thought they would cooperate. Right after the meeting Meir briefed Defence Minister Moshe DayanDefence Minister, 1967–1974, and Foreign Minister, 1977–1979.What they wanted: Defensible borders; and after 1977, as foreign minister, peace with Egypt.More on Moshe Dayan in “People and events” →.
In discussions held the next day with the Chief of Staff and with Dayan, a reassuring assessment took shape — and eleven days later the war broke out.
The secret channel to the King also ran across Gazit’s desk. In the office papers released by the State Archives in 2023, Hussein appears under code names. The diary records the 25 September meeting with “Lift”. In June 1973 Gazit sent Simcha DinitzIsrael’s ambassador in Washington from 1973.What they wanted: American arms and support, during the war and after it.More on Simcha Dinitz in “People and events” → a cable headed “More concerning Yanuka”, another name for the King, who came to the throne young. The cable dealt with the King’s fear that Arab armies would enter Jordanian territory if war broke out.
The meeting became one of the most charged questions in the study of the war: did Hussein warn Israel? The first press accounts, in 1993, described an explicit warning, and many see it as a warning of imminent war on two fronts. Gazit, who took the notes, rejected the claim that the King had warned Meir of an impending Arab attack.
In 1998, twenty-five years after the war, he set this out in a Haaretz article titled “Was There a Warning?”. He did not absolve the military leadership in it: in his view, Dayan and Chief of Staff David Elazar should have called up some reserves early in October, and their complete trust in the standing army prevented it.Diplomatic recordGolda Meir’s meeting with King Hussein, 25 September 1973 (Hebrew)Diplomatic recordynet — “Most likely, no war”: King Hussein’s code names (Hebrew)BiographyMordechai Gazit — Hebrew WikipediaDiplomatic recordTimes of Israel — Account of King Hussein’s 1973 war warningDiplomatic recordBruce Riedel — Enigma: The anatomy of Israel’s intelligence failureBook or articleWashington Institute — Miscalculations and Legacies: A Look Back at 1973
The lead source
Golda Meir’s meeting with King Hussein, 25 September 1973 (Hebrew) ↗Golda Meir Institute. An account attributed to a senior Military Intelligence officer: the meeting, Gazit taking the notes, and the discussions the next day.
Explore the sources and reading notes (6)
- Diplomatic Records[GMH] Golda Meir’s meeting with King Hussein, 25 September 1973 (Hebrew) ↗
Golda Meir Institute. An account attributed to a senior Military Intelligence officer: the meeting, Gazit taking the notes, and the discussions the next day.
- Life and Service[WHE] Mordechai Gazit — Hebrew Wikipedia ↗
The Hebrew Wikipedia article, including his position on the Hussein warning and the night at Zion Gate.
- Diplomatic Records[TOI] Times of Israel — Account of King Hussein’s 1973 war warning ↗
A 2013 report on the 25 September 1973 meeting and its participants, Gazit among them.
- Books, Articles and Letters[WI73] Washington Institute — Miscalculations and Legacies: A Look Back at 1973 ↗
2023. Quotes Gazit on calling up the reserves and on the war’s trauma, from Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings.
- Diplomatic Records[YN73] ynet — “Most likely, no war”: King Hussein’s code names (Hebrew) ↗
2023. On the documents released by the State Archives, including the office diary and Gazit’s June 1973 cable to Dinitz.
- Diplomatic Records[BRK] Bruce Riedel — Enigma: The anatomy of Israel’s intelligence failure ↗
Brookings, 2017. On the meeting with Hussein and the dispute over what was said.