Historical context and questions to explore
For three years, from 1967 to 1970, the Suez Canal bled: shelling, raids and air battles, in what became known as the War of Attrition. In August 1970 an American-brokered ceasefire took hold, with one important condition: no new missiles in the canal zone.
Egypt, with Soviet help, moved missile batteries forward all the same, and Israel protested. The United States was caught between them, and in 1971, when an initiative for a canal settlement was explored, Washington mediated again.
Why it mattered. Three years later, on 6 October 1973, those same batteries covered the Egyptian army as it crossed the canal. The arguments over “moving the missiles” were part of the road to war.
A question to think about
How do you protest a violation without breaking the channel to Washington, and hold Israel’s position even in the small print of procedure?
Why it was hard. Israel and Egypt had no direct contact. Every claim, reply or proposal passed through the American embassy, and every wording affected trust.
His part: Between the wars, as the Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Director-General for North American affairs, Gazit was the man facing the American embassy: he received its positions, clarified them and guarded Israel’s interest in the details.
In the years between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, Gazit was one of the American embassy’s points of contact in the Israeli government. Contemporary American cables show this quiet work: receiving positions, clarifying them, and protecting Israel’s interest in the details of procedure.
On 26 August 1970, a few weeks after the ceasefire that ended the War of Attrition, the embassy’s deputy chief of mission presented Washington’s position to him: Egypt was not entitled to move missile batteries within the standstill zone. In the same conversation he conveyed Egypt’s allegations of Israeli violations, suggesting they be passed to the military authorities for consideration.
A US embassy cable of 11 September 1970 records Gazit, then an assistant director-general of the Foreign Ministry, drawing the chargé’s attention to new SA-3 missile sites. Citing Soviet crews, he held Moscow directly responsible for a standstill violation and asked Washington to raise it there. The chargé recommended urgent consideration, subject to US verification; the cable records no outcome.
On 23 April 1971, days after Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” → handed the Americans Israel’s proposal for a Suez Canal arrangement, a written American reply arrived. Gazit gave the U.S. official a short, precise statement: Israel would discuss the matter with the Ambassador the following week, and asked that no document be delivered to Egypt. It is a hand setting the pace: a text that has not been agreed does not go out into the world.Diplomatic recordFRUS — Ceasefire violations, August 1970Diplomatic recordGazit’s warning about SA-3 sites, 1970Diplomatic recordFRUS — Israel’s Suez Canal proposal, April 1971
Sources and reading notes (3)
The lead source
FRUS — Ceasefire violations, August 1970 ↗FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 154, footnote 5. The U.S. deputy chief of mission presents the U.S. position on the military standstill to Gazit on 26 August 1970.
- Diplomatic Records[SA370] Gazit’s warning about SA-3 sites, 1970 ↗
Nixon Library. Tel Aviv 5009, 11 September 1970, 14:50 GMT, signed Zurhellen; paragraphs 2–3. Part of paragraph 1 is redacted.
- Diplomatic Records[FR70] FRUS — Ceasefire violations, August 1970 ↗
FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 154, footnote 5. The U.S. deputy chief of mission presents the U.S. position on the military standstill to Gazit on 26 August 1970.
- Diplomatic Records[FR71B] FRUS — Israel’s Suez Canal proposal, April 1971 ↗
FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 224, footnote 6. Gazit’s statement to the U.S. official on 23 April 1971.