Historical context and questions to explore
In the early 1960s Egypt was receiving Soviet aircraft and missiles, and Israel, relying mainly on France, looked for an answer. Until then the United States had refused to sell advanced weapons to the Middle East. In 1962 President Kennedy decided to break the rule and sell Israel Hawk anti-aircraft missiles.
The decision came in August 1962, after long contacts by the embassy in Washington. At the same time Israel was asking for something harder still: an American security guarantee.
Why it mattered. This was the first door into the security alliance with the United States, without which today’s Israel is hard to imagine. Gazit was at the Washington embassy in exactly the years that door opened.
A question to think about
How do you ask a hesitant superpower for weapons and guarantees as well, without the request looking like political pressure and backfiring?
Why it was hard. Washington feared an arms race and damage to its relations with the Arab world. Israel wanted not only weapons but security assurances, which were harder still to obtain.
His part: At the Washington embassy, beside Ambassador Harman, Gazit negotiated with the Americans on the Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, the first advanced weapons the United States sold Israel, and put forward his own idea for a presidential guarantee.
In February 1961 Gazit sat beside Ambassador Avraham HarmanIsrael’s ambassador in Washington, 1959–1968; Gazit was his deputy at the embassy.What they wanted: A close tie to the Kennedy administration, without the Dimona dispute damaging it.More on Avraham Harman in “People and events” → at the meeting where Israel’s request for Hawk missiles was put forward. In April 1962, he personally suggested a presidential letter assuring action against an Arab attack, coupled with Israeli restraint. Robert KomerA member of President Kennedy’s National Security Council staff; when he asked in 1963 about Israel’s nuclear intentions, he wrote in his memo “Gazit grinned”.What they wanted: To understand where Israel was heading on the nuclear question, and keep the Arab states’ trust in America.More on Robert Komer in “People and events” → recorded this as Gazit’s own idea, not an authorised government proposal.
When John F. KennedyPresident of the United States, 1961–1963. Gazit wrote a book on his policy.What they wanted: To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including at Dimona, and to build ties with the Arab states as well.More on John F. Kennedy in “People and events” →’s 1962 decision became public, Gazit analysed the disclosure in a telegram, as Hayim Iserovich’s historical article recounts. Gazit considered electoral timing while stressing professional advice and American national interests. In his view, in other words, the decision did not rest on a single political calculation.
Even after the Hawk deal he kept pressing. On 14 May 1963 he talked with Robert Komer, of President Kennedy’s National Security Council staff. He described the “hullabaloo” (his word) over relations between the two countries, and said flatly that it was likely to get worse unless the United States did “something” to meet Israel’s security requirements.
He asked why Washington was so reluctant to go beyond the old Tripartite Declaration, in which the United States, Britain and France had pledged in 1950 only to uphold the region’s existing borders, and why it settled for half measures instead of an open defence arrangement. Komer proposed a quiet dialogue between the diplomats, and Gazit felt it could be useful.
Then Komer came to the most sensitive question of all. He mentioned Israel’s “stalling on Dimona”, the American visits to the reactor. Then he asked: could recent statements by David Ben-GurionIsrael’s first Prime Minister.What they wanted: A strong state, and allies beyond the ring of hostility.More on David Ben-Gurion in “People and events” →, Moshe DayanDefence Minister, 1967–1974, and Foreign Minister, 1977–1979.What they wanted: Defensible borders; and after 1977, as foreign minister, peace with Egypt.More on Moshe Dayan in “People and events” → and others about strengthening Israel’s defences, together with Israel’s campaign against the German scientists building missiles for Egypt, be part of a campaign to justify Israeli development of nuclear weapons?
Or to threaten it, if the United States did not come through with a security pact? Komer recorded the answer in two words: “Gazit grinned.”
The grin can be read as an answer without an answer. Israel has never confirmed or denied having nuclear weapons, a policy later known as “nuclear ambiguity”, and an Israeli diplomat would not have answered such a question in words. Komer noted the grin, and moved on to the next subject.Diplomatic recordHarman and Gazit meet Bundy, 16 February 1961Diplomatic recordGazit’s conversation with Komer, 30 April 1962Diplomatic recordKennedy’s Hawk decision conveyed, 19 August 1962Diplomatic recordHawks vs. Doves: The Story of the First US-Israel Arms DealDiplomatic recordFRUS — Conversation with Israeli Minister Gazit, 14 May 1963
Explore the documents and connections
Sources and reading notes (5)
The lead source
Gazit’s conversation with Komer, 30 April 1962 ↗FRUS, volume XVII, document 259. Gazit’s own proposal for American security assurances, raised in a conversation with the Americans.
- Diplomatic Records[FR63K] FRUS — Conversation with Israeli Minister Gazit, 14 May 1963 ↗
FRUS 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, doc. 248. Robert Komer’s memorandum on security guarantees and the “hullabaloo” over US–Israeli relations.
- Diplomatic Records[I2] Hawks vs. Doves: The Story of the First US-Israel Arms Deal ↗
Hayim Iserovich, Israel Defense, 3 August 2018. the Gazit telegram it cites was not independently inspected.
- Diplomatic Records[D13] Harman and Gazit meet Bundy, 16 February 1961 ↗
FRUS, volume XVII, document 12. Gazit at the meeting, alongside Ambassador Harman, who presented the case for the Hawk missiles.
- Diplomatic Records[D14] Gazit’s conversation with Komer, 30 April 1962 ↗
FRUS, volume XVII, document 259. Gazit’s own proposal for American security assurances, raised in a conversation with the Americans.
- Diplomatic Records[D15] Kennedy’s Hawk decision conveyed, 19 August 1962 ↗
FRUS, volume XVIII, document 24. Feldman reports conveying the decision to Ben-Gurion, Meir and Kollek.