“Too sensible”: in Kissinger’s shuttle

His part: In Kissinger’s shuttle of March 1975 Gazit was the one holding the texts and the facts for the Israeli team.

In March 1975, between Rabin’s two White House visits, Henry Kissinger shuttled between Jerusalem and Aswan in pursuit of a second interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. Gazit sat on the Israeli negotiating team alongside Rabin, Yigal Allon, Shimon Peres, Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur and Foreign Ministry Director-General Avraham Kidron. The memoranda of those meetings, held at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, show him as the keeper of the texts and the facts.

On 14 March, when Kissinger reported that Sadat was willing to let American firms in despite the Arab boycott, Gazit noted that it would be on a selective basis only: “Because out of 20, he could admit only two. The blacklist remains.” At the same meeting, having given up on agreeing language with Fahmy for the clause on renewing the UN force, Kissinger said: “Maybe Gazit can work out something.”

On the morning of 19 March, at the Prime Minister’s Residence, Rabin opened with a question: “Do we have all the formulations, Gazit?” — “Yes, we have it,” he replied. When Dinitz mentioned President Nixon’s letter, Gazit supplied the date at once: July 1971.

At the same meeting Kissinger recounted telling Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmy, that Gazit could draft the clause; Fahmy, he said, replied that Gazit was “too sensible” and that it had to be the legal adviser, Meir Rosenne. The room laughed.

Sisco told Gazit it was a real compliment, and Allon added that when you get a compliment from Fahmy, you had better think again. To see why the room laughed, remember who was speaking. Egypt’s foreign minister, the other side of the table, called the Israeli diplomat “too sensible”, moderate and reasonable.

So he asked that the text be written instead by the delegation’s exacting lawyer. A compliment from the opponent, wrapped in a jab.

On 20 March — the morning Kissinger read to the Israeli team the stern statement on a “reassessment” of U.S. policy — Gazit handed Allon the draft of the non-use-of-force clause. When Kissinger remarked that the phrase “in the relations between themselves” had provoked an uproar from Fahmy, Gazit answered: “No. Take it out.”

At the end of the discussion Rabin asked: “Let Gazit and Simcha work to prepare ourselves for the Cabinet meeting.” By the evening meeting, a revised text was on the table.

In the last days of the round the same picture recurs. When Kissinger asked whether the armistice agreements had lasted 19 years, Gazit corrected him: “Eighteen.” The armistice agreements were signed in 1949 and held until the Six-Day War in 1967, eighteen years exactly.

A one-word correction, but it shows his place on the team: the one who remembered the dates and figures, in a room where every word was recorded. When Rabin said he was not offering a legal formula, Kissinger replied: “Gazit will do that.”

And when the discussion turned to how to announce the suspension of the talks, he advised that it be done in person. Gazit also sat in the final meeting, on the evening of 22 March in the Prime Minister’s office, where the shuttle was suspended.

The memorandum records that as the group rose from the table, one of those present said: “It is a Greek tragedy.” Kissinger replied that this was what made it worse — each side, following the laws of its own nature, had reached an outcome that was perfectly foreseeable. Talks resumed that summer and led to the interim agreement signed in September.

Eight days later, on 30 March, a “Top Secret” cable left Jerusalem for Washington carrying Rabin’s reply to President Ford. Rabin wrote that he shared the disappointment at the failure of the talks, that Israel had offered to withdraw from the passes and the oil fields, and that it remained ready to persist in the effort to reach an agreement with Egypt. The cable is signed with Gazit’s name.

After the shuttle was suspended, the team he headed went on preparing the next stage. Its working binder at the State Archives (A-4183/10) holds a six-page paper of 25 May 1975, “Proposal for a comprehensive settlement (which is not a peace agreement) with all the neighbouring states”.

The slip attached to it reads: “The draft was written by: M. Gazit (not yet discussed in the team)”. The paper opens: “Were it possible to achieve full and genuine peace with the Arab states at the present stage, Israel would, as is known, be prepared to go very far on the question of the territories.”

Its first premise: “Peace with the Arab states will be achieved gradually” (site translations).7 sources+

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