Historical context and questions to explore
January 1974. Kissinger flies back and forth between Aswan in Egypt and Jerusalem, and a new draft is waiting at every landing. On 18 January the first disengagement agreement with Egypt was signed: Israel pulled back from the canal’s west bank, and UN forces were placed between the armies.
Every change in the line, in force numbers or in types of weapons was examined at once on both sides, and redrafted before the next meeting.
Why it mattered. The disengagement agreement with Egypt was among the first agreements between Israel and an Arab neighbour since the 1949 armistice, and the first to draw new lines on the ground. It began the road that led, five years later, to the peace treaty with Egypt.
A question to think about
How do you follow draft after draft, and make sure the final text says exactly what was agreed?
Why it was hard. Some commitments were written into the public agreement, others into separate letters and understandings with the United States. One had to know exactly what was written where.
His part: In January 1974, around the working table with Kissinger, Gazit was the one revising the draft of the first disengagement agreement with Egypt.
A working lunch at the Prime Minister’s Office. The soup is too hot, so Yigal AllonDeputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister in Rabin’s government.What they wanted: Defensible borders, and a territorial compromise with Jordan (the “Allon Plan”).More on Yigal Allon in “People and events” → suggests getting down to business in the meantime; around the table, disengagement is discussed. Later he remarks that Gazit is still revising the draft, and sends every change in wording back to him.
Jokes and laughter made it into the memorandum too. Weighty matters of state moved forward around a lunch table, in a constant passage between political principle and the exact words that would go into the document.
A few days before the disengagement agreement was signed on 18 January 1974, Henry KissingerU.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.What they wanted: To push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and make the United States the only broker, through step-by-step agreements.More on Henry Kissinger in “People and events” → and the Israeli team went over the final drafts in the Prime Minister’s office. Handed a long list of points for his meeting with Anwar SadatPresident of Egypt, 1970–1981.What they wanted: To get Sinai back for Egypt, and move Egypt from Soviet to American patronage.More on Anwar Sadat in “People and events” →, Kissinger called it “commentary and exegesis” and asked for a simple checklist.
He sent Gazit and Harold SaundersU.S. National Security Council staff, the White House body that advises the president on foreign and security affairs.What they wanted: To prepare texts and options for Kissinger’s negotiations.More on Harold Saunders in “People and events” → of the National Security Council into the next room to draw up an agreed one. When they returned, Kissinger went through the new list item by item, and Gazit added context to a point the Chief of Staff had raised the night before.
After the signing, too, the work went through him. The file of incoming cables to his office at the State Archives (A-7060/7) keeps Ambassador Simcha DinitzIsrael’s ambassador in Washington from 1973.What they wanted: American arms and support, during the war and after it.More on Simcha Dinitz in “People and events” →’s cables from those weeks, most of them headed “To: Gazit – addressee only”. On 21 January Dinitz came back to him about a wording he had proposed by telephone for the Prime Minister’s statement on arms supplies.Diplomatic recordDiscussion of Disengagement, 15 January 1974Diplomatic recordFRUS — The final drafts before the disengagement agreement, January 1974Diplomatic recordState Archives — file A-7060/7: incoming cables from Simcha Dinitz to Mordechai Gazit, January–February 1974 (Hebrew)
Explore the documents and connections
Kissinger: This is a commentary and exegesis. Can someone do a simple checklist? Let Hal and Gazit get together in the next room and do an agreed checklist. [Mr. Saunders and Mr. Gazit go out.]
Kissinger: [goes over the new checklist prepared by Gazit and Saunders, reads the items] — sea minefield map.
Gazit: This was mentioned by the Chief of Staff last night.
Kissinger: This he won’t agree to.
Sources and reading notes (3)
The lead source
Discussion of Disengagement, 15 January 1974 ↗FRUS, Volume XXVI, Document 6. Gazit works on the wording of the draft during a working lunch in Jerusalem.
- Diplomatic Records[ISA70607] State Archives — file A-7060/7: incoming cables from Simcha Dinitz to Mordechai Gazit, January–February 1974 (Hebrew) ↗
A file of the Prime Minister’s Office, 259 scanned pages, read in full for this site. Incoming cables from Ambassador Dinitz and Minister Shalev in Washington, most of them headed “To: Gazit – addressee only”, from 1 January to 10 February 1974 (the date range on the cover), and two outgoing cables in Gazit’s name, among them his cable of 23 January 1974. Two pages are closed and three are blacked out.
- Diplomatic Records[D3] Discussion of Disengagement, 15 January 1974 ↗
FRUS, Volume XXVI, Document 6. Gazit works on the wording of the draft during a working lunch in Jerusalem.
- Diplomatic Records[FR74B] FRUS — The final drafts before the disengagement agreement, January 1974 ↗
FRUS, Volume XXVI, Document 7. Prime Minister’s office, Jerusalem. Kissinger sends Gazit and Saunders to draft an agreed checklist for the meeting with Sadat.