21 October 1971 · Jerusalem

A near-verbatim record

Mordechai (Motke) Gazit, 1922‎–‎2016: a fighter in 1948, a diplomat, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and ambassador to France. Meet him in five minutes →

Historical context and questions to explore

The Suez Canal, one of the world’s great trade arteries, had been closed since 1967, with two armies dug in on either bank. In February 1971 Egypt’s new president, Anwar Sadat, floated an idea: Israel would pull back a little from the canal, and it would reopen.

The United States tried to mediate. Both sides set out positions, and the question was whether the gap could be bridged.

Why it mattered. Had the canal reopened as early as 1971, the Middle East might have looked different. The idea did not come about then, but it became the basis for the agreements signed after the war, and in the end for peace with Egypt.

A question to think about

How do you take down every American formulation exactly and answer with the same precision, when any word might become the basis of an agreement? The initiative did not ripen, and two years later war broke out.

Why it was hard. Egypt saw the arrangement as a first step towards full withdrawal; Israel saw it as a separate arrangement. Every word on depth, military presence and timing carried great weight.

His part: In October 1971 Gazit sat beside Foreign Minister Eban at the meeting where the American interim-settlement initiative was presented, and recorded it almost word for word.

In October 1971 the United States sought to move Israel and Egypt toward negotiations on an interim Suez Canal agreement, without asking either side to change its positions in advance. The U.S. chargé d’affaires presented the idea to Foreign Minister , and Gazit sat beside him at the meeting.

Gazit took down the presentation practically verbatim, as the American telegram notes. Before the meeting he had gone over ’s report from Washington on his talk with with the American diplomat. At the end he added that Murad Ghaleb, mentioned as a possible Egyptian representative, was already known to be coming to New York for the UN General Assembly.

The canal stayed closed for four more years. It reopened only in June 1975, after a war and after the disengagement agreement, and the idea explored in 1971 came about by a far longer and more painful road.

A few weeks earlier, in September 1971, Gazit talked in Washington with Assistant Secretary of State . The embassy’s cable, kept at the State Archives (HZ-5973/2), records De Palma saying: “Israel underestimated very much how far the Egyptians have come.” Gazit, according to the cable, doubted whether the Egyptians were ready to see the partial arrangement as first of all an agreement to open the Canal.

Sources and reading notes (2)

The lead source

State Archives — file HZ-5973/2: Mordechai Gazit, M. Gazit’s visit to Washington, 1970‎–‎1971 (Hebrew) ↗

A Foreign Ministry file, 50 scanned pages, read in full for this site. The Washington embassy’s records of Gazit’s talks at the State Department on 20‎–‎21 July 1970 and in September 1971. The records were written by embassy staff; his words are reported speech.

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More from these years

1967‎–‎1972 · Between the wars