Historical context and questions to explore
In June 1967, in the middle of the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union broke off relations with Israel. The superpower arming Egypt and Syria became an official enemy, and within its borders remained millions of Jews, most of whom were not allowed to leave. The only possible conversation was a secret one.
The Soviet Union armed Egypt and Syria, while hundreds of thousands of Jews within its borders sought to emigrate to Israel. A secret channel allowed messages to pass without official relations.
Why it mattered. Every such channel, however secret and fragile, touched on war and peace and on the fate of Soviet Jewry. In 1973 warnings came through it too, and historians would argue after the war over how they were read.
A question to think about
How do you talk to the power arming your enemies, test whether it is ready to change, and not lose Washington’s trust?
Why it was hard. Any such contact had to be handled without undermining American trust, and without exposing the channel itself.
His part: Gazit led the Israeli side in the secret channel to Moscow: he sat across from the Soviet envoys, Yevgeny Primakov among them, and reported directly to Golda Meir.
Gazit led the Israeli side in the secret talks with Soviet representatives, including Yevgeny PrimakovSoviet orientalist and envoy in the secret channel to Moscow; later Prime Minister of Russia.What they wanted: To test whether Israel could be influenced without renewing relations, and to strengthen Moscow’s place in the peace process.More on Yevgeny Primakov in “People and events” →, in Vienna in 1971 and 1973, and meetings with Victor LouisA Soviet journalist who served as Moscow’s unofficial envoy to Israel, in 1971 and 1973.More on Victor Louis in “People and events” → in Jerusalem. In March 1973, his instructions excluded opening negotiations over a settlement. Contacts resumed in April 1975. Yair EvenA researcher; wrote on the secret talks between Jerusalem and Moscow.More on Yair Even in “People and events” →, who studied the channel, presents Gazit’s part alongside a critique: in his view, Israel misread Soviet intentions and warnings.
For the war’s fiftieth anniversary, the State Archives opened the file of “David Zion”, the code name given to Primakov. In March 1973 Primakov came to the talks in Vienna with a clear warning that Egypt would arm itself with sophisticated weapons able to strike places that were not yet vulnerable. The reports on those talks went directly to Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” →’s office through Gazit.
Even also documents Gazit’s part in detail: he led the Israeli side in the five Vienna talks of October 1971, the three talks there in March 1973, and the three meetings with Louis in Jerusalem in June 1973.
In Vienna he rejected the Soviet claim that time was working against Israel, and the Military Secretary cabled him that the Prime Minister backed the way he was conducting the talks. In the summary he sent Golda Meir on 27 March he wrote of the Soviet warnings: “I assess that there is not much substance in these threats”.
In June he told Louis that Israel did not believe another war would bring peace, and that it trusted in a long political process. About a hundred days later the war broke out.
On 15 June 1973, a week before the Richard NixonPresident of the United States, 1969–1974.What they wanted: Stability in the Middle East and a check on Soviet influence, without a direct clash between the powers.More on Richard Nixon in “People and events” →–Brezhnev summit, Gazit, then Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, met the Soviet journalist Victor Louis. The two talked about the emigration of Soviet Jews and about the low point in relations between the two countries.
Three further sources fill in the picture, each from a different angle. According to Primakov’s memoirs, as cited by the historian Alec EpsteinA historian; wrote on Israel’s relations with Egypt.More on Alec Epstein in “People and events” →, from 22 to 26 March 1973 Primakov and the KGB officer Yuri KotovA KGB officer who served in Israel until 1967; joined Primakov in the secret talks.More on Yuri Kotov in “People and events” → met in Vienna with Gazit and Hanan Bar-OnDiplomat; worked beside Gazit, who led the secret channel to Moscow, in the early 1970s.More on Hanan Bar-On in “People and events” →.
Ephraim HalevyMossad officer and later its head; from 1974 he coordinated the Soviet channel.More on Ephraim Halevy in “People and events” →, later head of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, said in an interview that at the Foreign Ministry two men handled the channel, Gazit and Bar-On, until in 1974 Yitzhak RabinPrime Minister, 1974–1977; earlier Deputy Chief of Staff and ambassador in Washington.What they wanted: To move step by step, through interim agreements, in return for American guarantees and arms.More on Yitzhak Rabin in “People and events” → moved responsibility for coordinating the channel to the Mossad, to Halevy.
And Primakov himself wrote of the 1973 Vienna meetings: “It was noticeable that Gazit, not to mention Bar-On, did not push the argument further, and softened the tone of his remarks.” In the same paragraph Primakov also criticised Israel’s confidence in its military superiority and its assessment that the Arabs would not start a war.
And Kotov described 8 April 1975. At Vienna airport, he recalled, he and Primakov bought the Austrian paper Kurier, and found a cartoon on the front page: a Soviet officer handing a palm branch to a man in a kippah, with a nuclear bomb hidden behind his back. Beside it was a report of secret talks in Israel.
Kotov called Gazit on the line set aside for the secret contact. By his account, Gazit already knew, expressed regret, said the inquiry pointed to an accidental leak by a technical employee, and promised the matter would be looked into. Moscow decided to accept the explanation, and the contacts went on.
Primakov, in his memoirs, tells it differently: in his version there was a suspicion of a deliberate leak by someone opposed to the rapprochement.Diplomatic recordYair Even — Secret talks with MoscowDiplomatic recordWilson Center Digital Archive — documents on Mordechai GazitDiplomatic recordChannel 13 — “David Zion”: Primakov’s warning before the warBook or articleAlec Epstein — Israel and Egypt: Half a Century without War (Russian)TestimonyInterview with Ephraim Halevy, in “30 Years of Full Russian–Israeli Diplomatic Relations” (Russian), eds. Zvi Magen and Daniel Rakov, MGIMO and INSS, 2021TestimonyYuri Kotov — “Difficult negotiations”, in “Неизвестный Примаков. Воспоминания”, vol. 1, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia, 2016TestimonyYevgeny Primakov — Конфиденциально. Ближний Восток на сцене и за кулисами (2nd ed., 2012)
Explore the documents and connections
Sources and reading notes (7)
- Diplomatic Records[WC1] Wilson Center Digital Archive — documents on Mordechai Gazit ↗
Wilson Center, Washington. State Department memoranda of conversation from April–June 1961 on the American visit to Dimona, and a record of Gazit’s meeting with Victor Louis on 15 June 1973. The record is kept at the Israel State Archives (Record Group 130, Foreign Ministry, file 5973/4) and was published in English by Guy Laron (CWIHP e-Dossier 31, 2012).
- Diplomatic Records[C13] Channel 13 — “David Zion”: Primakov’s warning before the war ↗
2023. On the State Archives file of the secret Soviet envoy; Gazit passed the reports directly to Golda Meir’s office.
- Diplomatic Records[S1] Yair Even — Secret talks with Moscow ↗
Yesodot 5 (2023), PDF pp. 25–57.
- Books, Articles and Letters[EPS22] Alec Epstein — Israel and Egypt: Half a Century without War (Russian) ↗
Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, Moscow, 2022. pp. 28–33: Gazit’s records of the meetings of 1–3 November 1973 and his “conclusions” of 5 November, IDF Archives, file 14–58/79 (the meeting of 4 November was recorded by Mordechai Shalev); the Watergate point on p. 32; and the Vienna meeting of 22–26 March 1973, per Primakov’s memoirs (2012 edition, pp. 286–287).
- Interviews and Testimony[HAL21] Interview with Ephraim Halevy, in “30 Years of Full Russian–Israeli Diplomatic Relations” (Russian), eds. Zvi Magen and Daniel Rakov, MGIMO and INSS, 2021 ↗
pp. 40–41: the Soviet channel passed to the Foreign Ministry, “in the hands of Director-General Mordechai Gazit and his chef de cabinet Hanan Bar-On”, and under Rabin to the Mossad. In Russian; its chronology of the channel’s start does not fully match Primakov’s.
- Interviews and Testimony[KOT16] Yuri Kotov — “Difficult negotiations”, in “Неизвестный Примаков. Воспоминания”, vol. 1, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia, 2016 ↗
Memoir of the KGB officer who took part in the secret channel, in Russian. pp. 180–182: the Kurier cartoon and the phone call with Gazit, 8 April 1975. Kotov calls Gazit “director-general of the Foreign Ministry”; at the time he was Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office. His version of the leak, an accident, differs from Primakov’s, and the description of the cartoon is his; the newspaper issue itself has not been checked.
- Interviews and Testimony[PRI12] Yevgeny Primakov — Конфиденциально. Ближний Восток на сцене и за кулисами (2nd ed., 2012) ↗
Memoirs, in Russian. pp. 286–287: the Vienna meetings of 22–26 March 1973, and the impression that Gazit “softened the tone of his remarks” (p. 287); pp. 297–298: his version of the 1975 leak, a suspected deliberate leak.