Experience turned into writing
Historical context and questions to explore
1980. After 31 years of service, just as the archives of the state’s first years are beginning to open, Gazit changes rooms: from the rooms where decisions were made to the library.
He wrote books and articles in English and Hebrew on the peace process, John F. KennedyPresident of the United States, 1961–1963. Gazit wrote a book on his policy.What they wanted: To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including at Dimona, and to build ties with the Arab states as well.More on John F. Kennedy in “People and events” →’s policy, mediation in the conflict, and historical debates over 1948 and 1971.
Why it mattered. Few people both made history and wrote it from the documents. His books and articles are the testimony of an insider who takes care to check himself, and the questions he asked, about 1948 and the years before 1973, still occupy historians.
A question to think about
How does a witness become research others can check, without giving up what only he saw?
Why it was hard. Someone who was in the room knows things that are not in the documents, but also carries memory and views. His writing deliberately rests on documents.
Gazit returned to negotiations in which he had taken part and examined them as a historian. The notes below introduce the books’ questions and evidence, and, where available, responses from other historians.Book or articleThe Peace Process, 1969–1973: Efforts and ContactsBook or articlePresident Kennedy’s Policy toward the Arab States and IsraelBook or articleIsraeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace
His own involvement matters when reading him. He knew the people and the negotiations, and he also defended decisions that other historians criticised. The book summaries retain that distinction and link to both his writing and the debate around it.Book or articleThe Peace Process, 1969–1973: Efforts and ContactsBook or articlePresident Kennedy’s Policy toward the Arab States and IsraelBook or articleNegotiation and Mediation in the Middle East: Lessons from Fifty YearsBook or articleIsraeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace
Buy or read: his three books, and where to get them
A research fellow at the Truman Institute
Gazit was a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. The Golda Meir Institute’s 1987 interview catalogue identifies him as a researcher at Truman.Golda collection
Based at the Hebrew University, the institute studies the Middle East and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, combining academic research with dialogue among scholars and public figures. This gives context to Gazit’s move from diplomatic service to examining the history and practice of peacemaking.Book or articleThe Truman Institute — AboutBook or articleThe Peace Process, 1969–1973: Efforts and ContactsBook or articleIsraeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace
The institute’s Bogen Library lists Gazit’s personal archive among its collections. Its page provides a starting point for enquiries about additional material and access.Book or article
The Hebrew University library catalogue now lists the “Mordechai Gazit Archive” in detail: correspondence and papers from his years in government and the Foreign Ministry and from his academic work. Among its series are the 1975 interim agreement, testimonies on the battles of 1948, his speeches as ambassador in France, and 1998 interviews for the Yitzhak Rabin commemoration project. The archive can be consulted at the library.BiographyMordechai Gazit Archive — archive record, Hebrew University LibraryBiographyMordechai Gazit Archive — “The Israel–Egypt Interim Agreement: Correspondence and Memoranda”
Two letters from the archive, which he wrote to his parents in 1948, are shown on this site in full, with the scanned pages: 10 April, after Qastal, and 19 June, from hospital.
Highlights from the archive
- A letter to his parents, written about a month after he was wounded in the Old City ↗
- His and Maj. Gen. Herzl Shafir’s letter of appointment to represent Israel at the Geneva Peace Conference, 1975 ↗
- A letter he wrote to Yitzhak Rabin on the interim arrangements ↗
- A statement he made to the military working group in Geneva, 23 September 1975 ↗
- Speeches in French and Yiddish from his ambassadorship, 1976–1977 ↗
- A 1998 interview transcript for the Rabin commemoration project, with his handwritten corrections ↗
Browse the Archive for Middle Eastern Studies and Israel Studies ↗
To request access, cite the call number GAZ P6-1 and the archive record 9920982778503701.
The Peace Process, 1969–1973: the question he set himself
Historical context and questions to explore
After the Yom Kippur War, while the grief was still fresh, a hard question was asked: had Golda Meir’s government missed a chance for peace with Egypt in 1969–1973, one that might have prevented the war? A man who had been in the rooms decided to answer it from the documents.
In those years many initiatives arose: the Rogers plans, named after the American Secretary of State, the UN’s Gunnar JarringSwedish diplomat, UN envoy to the Middle East, 1967–1971.What they wanted: A peace agreement based on Security Council Resolution 242.More on Gunnar Jarring in “People and events” → mission, the idea of a Suez Canal arrangement, and the mission of Hafez IsmailNational security adviser to Egypt’s President Sadat. In 1973 he conducted secret contacts with Kissinger on Sadat’s behalf.More on Hafez Ismail in “People and events” →, Anwar SadatPresident of Egypt, 1970–1981.What they wanted: To get Sinai back for Egypt, and move Egypt from Soviet to American patronage.More on Anwar Sadat in “People and events” →’s adviser. None came to fruition.
Why it mattered. This is one of the most painful questions in Israel’s history: could the Yom Kippur War and its more than 2,600 dead have been prevented? Gazit, who had been in the rooms, wrote a whole book to answer it from the documents. His conclusion — that no opportunity was missed — is disputed to this day, and is part of the great debate over Golda Meir and the war.
A question to think about
Was a chance for peace missed? And how do you answer without the wisdom of hindsight?
Why it was hard. Many of the documents were still classified, and the question stirred strong feelings because of the war’s cost. Scholars and public figures reached opposite conclusions.
Gazit prepared this study in 1982, as a fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University. It appeared in English in 1983, and in Hebrew in 1984 through Yad Tabenkin, with help from the Golda Meir Cultural Centre at Revivim. The Hebrew edition can now be read as an e-book, and its opening chapter is open to all.
The book asks one question: did Golda Meir’s government pursue a sound policy for advancing peace between 1969 and 1973? His method was to analyse every proposal raised during her two terms, and how Israel, Egypt and the United States responded to each. He noted why the question is asked of her years far more than of the Eshkol years before them: the assumption that the seeds of the Yom Kippur War were sown then; the view that while Nasser lived the chances of dialogue with Egypt were nil; and Eshkol’s image as a peace-seeker, against the image of Meir as inflexible.
His argument is clear and pointed. He wrote that Israel did not misread Egypt’s positions: in return for a hundred-per-cent withdrawal it could have obtained a “modus vivendi”, but the consensus of the major parties would not settle for that. It was right, he conceded, that clinging to Israel’s positions prevented a settlement before 1973 — but in his words, “what was missed was not a peace treaty, but a vague and hazy arrangement”, on the model of the 1957 Sinai arrangement, whose unreliability was proven in 1967. He also rejected Sadat’s later account that in the last year of his life Nasser had decided to make peace, pointing to the missile move of August 1970.
The critics, he argued, overlook that Meir’s government took several decisions that should have improved the chances of peace — first among them accepting the Rogers initiative in July 1970, at the price of breaking up the national unity government — and his book examines why they bore no fruit. It is his reading within a debate that continues: other scholars, such as Uri Bar-Joseph, argue that Sadat’s initiative of February 1973 was a real opportunity that was turned down. The chapter on the Jarring mission connects directly to the file he himself handled.Book or articleThe Peace Process, 1969–1973: Efforts and ContactsBook or articleMordechai Gazit — The Peace Process (1969–1973), Hebrew e-bookBook or articleUri Bar-Joseph — Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat’s Peace Initiative of February 1973
The chapters of the book
- Introduction
- A peace treaty and defensible borders
- Securing a regular supply of arms from the United States
- The deep-penetration bombing of Egypt
- The Dr Goldmann affair
- The second Rogers initiative, summer 1970
- The Jarring mission, 1970–1971
- The efforts for an arrangement to open the Suez Canal
- The Hafez Ismail mission
- The Palestinian–Jordanian question
- Summary and conclusions
Back to the documents: a debate over 1948
Historical context and questions to explore
At the end of the War of Independence the West Bank and East Jerusalem remained in Jordan’s hands. Forty years later, as the documents opened, historians argued fiercely: had Israel given them up willingly, perhaps even in a secret agreement between Ben-Gurion and King Abdallah?
Some scholars argued that David Ben-GurionIsrael’s first Prime Minister.What they wanted: A strong state, and allies beyond the ring of hostility.More on David Ben-Gurion in “People and events” → and King Abdallah IKing of Jordan until his assassination in 1951. Gazit researched the contacts with him.What they wanted: To enlarge his kingdom, even at the price of a settlement with Israel.More on King Abdallah I in “People and events” → had reached a secret agreement or a quiet understanding that Israel would not enter territory Jordan controlled. Others stressed demographic, political and military considerations.
Why it mattered. Why Israel did not take the West Bank in 1948 is a question about the state’s borders and Ben-Gurion’s fateful decisions. Gazit joined the historians’ debate to test a claim that had become almost a myth, and went back to the documents themselves.
A question to think about
How do you judge a 1948 decision by what was known and feared then, not by what seems obvious today?
Why it was hard. Secret contacts with Abdallah did take place, which makes it hard to distinguish a partnership of interests from a binding commitment. The answer depends on a careful reading of the documents.
In February 1989, in Maarachot 314, Gazit joined a historians’ debate: why did Israel not try to take the West Bank at the end of the War of Independence? Scholars had argued that the restraint stemmed from a secret agreement — or at least a binding understanding — between Ben-Gurion and King Abdallah. Gazit disputed this. Among the hundreds of Israeli, British and American documents of the period, he wrote, not one confirmed such an agreement.
In its place he proposed a combination of considerations: the top priority given to the Negev, heavy American pressure, the fear of British intervention under Britain’s defence treaty with Jordan, and the coming struggle over Israel’s borders. He also rejected the argument that demographic concern decided the matter, pointing out that Ben-Gurion had tried to take the Gaza Strip, with its population, in 1948, and in April 1949 told a senior American envoy that if Egypt did not want Gaza because of its refugees, Israel would accept it and let those refugees return to their homes.
He acknowledged a certain partnership of interests between Israel and Jordan, but drew a sharp line: “a partnership of interests does not yet amount to a de facto agreement, let alone a de jure one”. That distinction — precision about what political concepts mean, and a close reading of the options open to decision-makers — runs through his work as a historian. It is his argument within a scholarly debate, not a verdict that settled it.
The article builds on his own earlier research: a 1987 study in Ha-Tziyonut of the fate of Ben-Gurion’s 1949 proposal to include the Gaza Strip, with all its population, within Israel; and an earlier Maarachot article on Operation Horev. The American telegram he cites — Ethridge’s report of his meeting with Ben-Gurion in Tiberias on 18 April 1949 — is available in full in the FRUS series.Book or articleMordechai Gazit — “On the Myth of the Deal, the Understanding and the Agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah” (Hebrew)Book or articleMordechai Gazit — “The Vicissitudes of Ben-Gurion’s 1949 Proposal to Include the Gaza Strip, with All Its Population, within Israel” (Hebrew)Diplomatic recordFRUS — Ethridge with Ben-Gurion in Tiberias, 18 April 1949
Exchanging knowledge, even in disagreement
Historical context and questions to explore
The 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live in the West Bank under Israeli rule, many of them Jordanian citizens, and the question of their status is at the centre of the debate. This correspondence ran between two men on opposite sides of that question.
Aziz ShehadehA Ramallah lawyer, one of the first Palestinians to back a Palestinian state alongside Israel openly; murdered in 1985.What they wanted: A Palestinian state alongside Israel, decided by the Palestinians themselves.More on Aziz Shehadeh in “People and events” → was a Palestinian lawyer from Ramallah. Gazit, then a researcher at the Truman Institute, corresponded with him in 1982 on a legal question arising in his research.
Why it mattered. A correspondence between a former Israeli diplomat and a Palestinian lawyer from Ramallah, in the 1980s, before the intifada and before Oslo, is a rare moment. It shows that even people on opposite sides of the conflict could conduct a serious argument, letter by letter.
A question to think about
How do you argue with a colleague over a history you both lived, and keep respecting each other?
Why it was hard. The two stood on opposite sides of the conflict and held different views. The correspondence showed not agreement but a willingness to examine arguments on their merits.
The University of Exeter’s archive holds two letters: one from Gazit to the Palestinian lawyer Aziz Shehadeh, and Shehadeh’s reply. Gazit wrote on Truman Institute letterhead and shared research material about Jordanian citizenship. The reply offered a legal analysis that challenged the argument under examination.
This correspondence shows the work behind the writing: questions, exchanges of material and detailed answers.Book or articleGazit to Aziz Shehadeh, 20 April 1982Book or articleAziz Shehadeh to Gazit, 25 May 1982
Getting to know Jewish life across the ocean
Historical context and questions to explore
American Jewry is the largest Jewish community in the world outside Israel. In the 1980s Israelis came to understand that it could not be known only as a source of support; they needed to know the life itself: the young leaders, the writers and the schools.
Public institutions built education and leadership programmes to connect the communities. After his years of service, Gazit worked on such programmes with the Institute on American Jewish–Israeli Relations.
Why it mattered. American Jewry is one of Israel’s pillars, politically and economically, but the bond between the two communities cannot be taken for granted. After his years of service, including five in Washington where he came to know American Jewry closely, Gazit worked on building real acquaintance between Israelis and the communities across the ocean.
A question to think about
How do you connect the two great centres of the Jewish people, when each sees the other differently?
Why it was hard. Most Israelis knew little about Jewish community life in the United States. Bringing the subject into education required cooperation with the Education Ministry, and funding.
A report by Gazit for the Institute on American Jewish–Israeli Relations reveals another strand of work after government service: preparations for a young leadership program, hopes of including writers and poets, and developing teaching about American Jewry in Israeli schools.
The report distinguishes preliminary research from cooperation still to be developed with the Education Ministry. It also considers educational television programs and their high costs.
Read the original report — PDF page 129English · archive PDF, about 30 MB. If the file opens at the beginning, enter 129 in the PDF page selector.
Sources and reading notes (1)
- Books, Articles and Letters[C1] Mordechai Gazit — Institute on American Jewish–Israeli Relations report, November–December 1985 ↗
Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, MS-603, Series D, Box 60, Folder 3, PDF page 129. Gazit’s typed name appears below the report. The folder is dated 1986–1987, but the report explicitly covers late 1985.
His books (3)
Three books of his own, from the first studies of 1983 to the book that sums up the whole road, in 2002. Each one with what it is about and where to get it.
2002The book that sums it all up
Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace
Israeli diplomacy and the pursuit of peace
- The question
- What did a veteran diplomat learn about negotiation, mediation and the Foreign Ministry, from Britain to Egypt and Jordan?
The book examines mediation through Bernadotte’s mission, talks with King Abdullah, Nahum Goldmann’s initiative, and the Hussein–Peres London agreement. Other chapters address Ben-Gurion’s Gaza policies, American arms procurement, Dimona, and the Foreign Ministry’s role, connecting diplomatic episodes with the institutions and relationships behind them.Book or article
In print: new, in paperback and digital
Get it:PurchaseBuy from the publisher · Routledge ↗PurchaseDigital edition · Amazon Kindle ↗PreviewLimited preview · Google Books ↗
Who it is for, and all the editions
- Who it suits
- The general reader. The book that sums up his research, available today from Routledge.
Find this work
Frank Cass, first edition 2002; now marketed by Routledge. Paperback ISBN: 9781138973435.
Print and digital edition listings were found. Prices, purchase eligibility and preview access are set by the providers and may vary by country.
1983
The Peace Process, 1969–1973: Efforts and Contacts
The peace process: efforts and contacts
- The question
- Was an opportunity for peace with Egypt missed in 1969–1973, one that might have prevented the Yom Kippur War?
Gazit challenges the claim that an achievable peace with Egypt was missed before the Yom Kippur War. The Hebrew edition’s contents cover the Rogers initiative, Jarring’s diplomacy, reopening the Suez Canal, Hafez Ismail’s mission, American weapons supplies, and the Palestinian–Jordanian question.Book or articleThe Peace Process, 1969–1973: Efforts and ContactsBook or articleThe Peace Process, 1969–1973
The Hebrew edition (1984) is available as an e-book. The English edition is out of print; second-hand copies exist
Get it:PurchaseBuy the Hebrew e-book; first chapter free · Psik ↗Second-handUsed copies of the English edition · AbeBooks ↗PublisherHebrew edition · Publisher ↗
Who it is for, and all the editions
- Who it suits
- Anyone who wants to understand the road to the Yom Kippur War from the inside. A research book, also available in Hebrew as an e-book.
Find this work
English: Magnes Press, 1983, 155 pp. Hebrew: “The Peace Process (1969–1973)”, “Red Line” series, Yad Tabenkin and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1984.
The Hebrew book can be read on Kotar or bought as an e-book on Psik. The original English edition is available today as a used copy.
The publisher listed this edition as out of stock when checked.
1983
President Kennedy’s Policy toward the Arab States and Israel
President Kennedy’s policy towards the Arab states and Israel
- The question
- How did President Kennedy change US policy toward Israel and the Arab states, and what does it tell us about the beginnings of the alliance?
This study combines analysis and documents on Kennedy’s policies toward Arab states and Israel during 1961–1963. The partial contents identify a separate treatment of policy toward Israel, placing the bilateral relationship within a wider regional frame.Book or article
Out of print: second-hand copies, and in libraries
Where to find it:Second-handUsed copies · AbeBooks ↗Research instituteOrder enquiries · Moshe Dayan Center ↗CatalogueLibrary holdings · CiNii ↗
Who it is for, and all the editions
- Who it suits
- Readers of American and Middle Eastern history. Includes documents, written by someone who was at the Washington embassy at the time.
Find this work
Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv University, 1983. English; 133 pp. ISBN 9652240036.
The Moshe Dayan Center included the book in a 2025 sale list. Contact the center to check whether it can still be ordered; the advertised sale has ended.
All his books and articles can also be borrowed or consulted in libraries: National Library of Israel ↗ · WorldCat ↗
Articles, essays and lectures (10)
Read in order, they trace a biography of thought: who really shapes Israel’s foreign policy, the roots of the alliance with the United States, the years before 1973, and back to 1948 and to what was possible with Jordan and in Gaza. Beside each work is the question it asks.
The Role of the Foreign Ministry
The role of the Foreign Ministry
- The question
- Who really shapes Israel’s foreign policy, and where does the Foreign Ministry stand beside the prime minister and the defence establishment?
Get it:The publication’s page ↗
About the work, and how to get it
The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 18, 1981, pp. 3–14. Written just after 31 years of service, on the Foreign Ministry’s place in Israel’s foreign-policy decisions. Cited in later research on Israel’s foreign policy.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Anyone curious about how policy decisions are made in Israel. A short article, 12 pages.
America and Israel
An essay on the special relationship
- The question
- How far can Israel lean on the United States, and where are the limits of the “special relationship”?
Get it:The publication’s page ↗
About the work, and how to get it
Partisan Review, vol. 49, no. 3, 1982. An analysis of the special relationship with the United States, its benefits and the limits of relying on an ally. A version later appeared in his 2002 book under the title “A special relationship not always special”. This is his interpretation, not a neutral account of the disputes.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Readers interested in US–Israel relations. An article; a version appears in his 2002 book.
Moves and Contacts Against an Impenetrable Wall
Paper from a seminar on Golda Meir’s governments and the peace process; translated title
- The question
- Why did the diplomatic contacts of Golda Meir’s years keep hitting a wall?
Get it:ReadRead at the Golda Meir Institute (PDF) ↗
A short guide to reading the paperAbout the work, and how to get it
Gazit defends the Meir governments against accusations of missed peace opportunities, emphasizing obstacles in Arab positions and international mediation. He allows for a possible American missed opportunity in the Ismail channel. This retrospective argument does not detail his own diplomatic missions.Book or articleMordechai Gazit — Moves and contacts against an impenetrable wallGolda collectionGolda Meir’s governments and the peace process
- Who it suits
- Hebrew readers. A short essay, scanned and open to read.
Find this work
Seminar, 22 July 1985. Hebrew scan, pp. 21–36 plus cover.
The full document is open to read on the Golda Meir Institute’s website.
ממשלת המערך ותהליך השלום — חוברת סא
The Alignment Government and the Peace Process — two contributions
- The question
- Did the Labour government miss a chance for peace? A public debate, including with Yossi Beilin.
Get it:ReadContents and reading options · Kotar ↗
About the work, and how to get it
This booklet records a Yad Tabenkin discussion about whether Alignment governments missed opportunities for peace. Gazit argues against that interpretation and replies to Yossi Beilin, who takes the opposing position. Contributions by Simcha Dinitz, Israel Beitman, and Moshe Carmel place their exchange within a wider debate.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Anyone who wants to hear the debate itself, from both sides, not just its conclusions.
Find this work
Booklet 61, 1986; in Hebrew. Includes two contributions by Mordechai Gazit.
The contents and reading options are on Kotar.
The Vicissitudes of Ben-Gurion’s 1949 Proposal to Include the Gaza Strip, with All Its Population, within Israel
A study of a 1949 political proposal
- The question
- Why did Ben-Gurion propose in 1949 to include the Gaza Strip, with all its inhabitants, within Israel, and why did the proposal fail?
Get it:The publication’s page ↗
About the work, and how to get it
Ha-Tziyonut, vol. 12, 1987 (Hebrew). A study of the proposal Ben-Gurion raised in 1949, and of the diplomatic move that lasted months and failed because of Egypt’s opposition.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Readers interested in the state’s first years and in the question of Gaza, which never left the agenda.
The Israel–Jordan Peace Negotiations (1949–1951): King Abdallah’s Lonely Effort
The Israel–Jordan peace negotiations, 1949–1951
- The question
- Could peace with Jordan have been reached as early as 1949–1951, and what was left of the effort after King Abdallah’s assassination?
Get it:The publication’s page ↗
About the work, and how to get it
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, no. 3, 1988, pp. 409–424. A return to the years when his own service began, and to the contacts with King Abdallah until his assassination in 1951. The article is still cited in research on Israel–Jordan relations.Book or article
- Who it suits
- English readers interested in Israel–Jordan relations. A short academic article, still cited today.
On the Myth of the Deal, the Understanding and the Agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah
A historical debate about 1948
- The question
- Was there a secret agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah, as historians claimed?
Get it:The publication’s page ↗
About the work, and how to get it
Maarachot 314, February 1989 (Hebrew). A short, pointed article disputing the claim of a secret agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah, and proposing a combination of political and military considerations instead. See “Back to the documents” on this page.Book or articleMordechai Gazit — “On the Myth of the Deal, the Understanding and the Agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah” (Hebrew)Diplomatic recordFRUS — Ethridge with Ben-Gurion in Tiberias, 18 April 1949
- Who it suits
- Anyone interested in the debate over 1948. A short, sharp article.
עושי שלום — תיווך בסכסוך הישראלי־ערבי
Peacemakers — Mediation in the Israeli–Arab Conflict: an essay on mediation
- The question
- What makes a mediator succeed, and what can fifty years of mediation in the conflict teach?
Get it:CatalogueFind the volume · National Library of Israel ↗
About the work, and how to get it
Gazit’s essay examines mediation in the Arab–Israeli conflict within a collection drawing lessons from fifty years of negotiation. It appears alongside work by Kenneth Stein and Samuel Lewis, with Sheryl Brown’s participation. The catalogue identifies this shared setting.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Readers interested in negotiation and mediation, beyond the Middle East too.
Find this work
In Negotiation and Mediation in the Middle East: Lessons from Fifty Years, Moshe Dayan Center, 1993. Hebrew.
Gazit’s essay in a volume published by the Moshe Dayan Center, alongside other scholars and practitioners.
Egypt and Israel — Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971?
Was an opportunity for peace missed in 1971?
- The question
- Was Sadat’s 1971 initiative a chance for peace that Israel missed?
Get it:ReadArticle and access options · SAGE ↗
About the work, and how to get it
The article asks whether Israel and Egypt had a genuine opportunity for peace in 1971. Its public notes engage Sadat’s speeches, Jarring’s mission, proposals concerning the Suez Canal, and political memoirs. The central historical question is whether those initiatives and positions could have supported an agreed settlement.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Researchers and students. An academic article in English, by someone who was inside the discussion at the time.
Find this work
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 32, no. 1, January 1997, pp. 97–115.
The article is available from SAGE, to buy or through an academic library.
The Genesis of the US–Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue
The beginnings of the strategic relationship with the United States and the Dimona issue
- The question
- How was the US–Israeli security alliance born, and what part did the Dimona question play?
Get it:ReadAbstract and article access · SAGE ↗
About the work, and how to get it
Gazit examines the emerging defence relationship under Kennedy through regional arms balance, assurances of support, and contacts between military officials. He highlights a meeting involving Yitzhak Rabin ten days before Kennedy’s assassination, and asks whether concerns about Dimona shaped the development of American–Israeli defence ties.Book or article
- Who it suits
- Anyone interested in the roots of the alliance with the United States. An academic article, by someone who was there at the time.
Find this work
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 35, no. 3, July 2000, pp. 413–422.
The abstract is public. Full-text options include institutional access or paid access through the publisher.