In these years Gazit stood at the heart of Israel’s decision-making: at the head of the Foreign Ministry, and then at the head of the Prime Minister’s Office, as political adviser to two prime ministers. In 1972 he headed the Foreign Ministry as its Director-General.
On 5 September 1972, the day of the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, the ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak RabinPrime Minister, 1974–1977; earlier Deputy Chief of Staff and ambassador in Washington.What they wanted: To move step by step, through interim agreements, in return for American guarantees and arms.More on Yitzhak Rabin in “People and events” →, reported to him on his conversation with Secretary of State William RogersU.S. Secretary of State, that is, foreign minister, 1969–1973.What they wanted: A comprehensive American peace plan, and first of all a ceasefire in the War of Attrition.More on William Rogers in “People and events” →. The next day the two exchanged cables on the American position on halting the Games.
On 15 March 1973 he entered Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” →’s office as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and her political adviser, succeeding Simcha DinitzIsrael’s ambassador in Washington from 1973.What they wanted: American arms and support, during the war and after it.More on Simcha Dinitz in “People and events” →, who left to serve as ambassador in Washington.
From that day he sat in “Golda’s kitchen”: the small forum of the Prime Minister and her senior ministers, where the important decisions took shape before they were brought to the cabinet. He kept the post under Yitzhak Rabin.
On 18 April 1973 he sat in the discussion of whether Egypt and Syria were about to attack, one of the three war “alarms” he later counted in his testimony to the Agranat Commission, the inquiry into the Yom Kippur War. In the spring of 1973 Henry KissingerU.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.What they wanted: To push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and make the United States the only broker, through step-by-step agreements.More on Henry Kissinger in “People and events” → held secret contacts with Hafez IsmailNational security adviser to Egypt’s President Sadat. In 1973 he conducted secret contacts with Kissinger on Sadat’s behalf.More on Hafez Ismail in “People and events” →, the national security adviser of Egypt’s President Anwar SadatPresident of Egypt, 1970–1981.What they wanted: To get Sinai back for Egypt, and move Egypt from Soviet to American patronage.More on Anwar Sadat in “People and events” →.
Gazit sent Ambassador Dinitz cables on the matter on 13 and 15 May, the second conveying Golda Meir’s comments. Five days later, on 20 May, Kissinger and Ismail met for the second time, near Paris. In the secret cables between Jerusalem and Washington, Kissinger went by the code name “Shaul”.
In a letter to Dinitz that spring Gazit wondered whether Kissinger was telling Israel everything that passed in the channel, and wrote: “Quite a few questions remain unanswered, and some doubts gnaw at our hearts”.
In 2019 three scholars published an article on this channel in an international journal of intelligence studies, and named it after his file: “Kissinger’s Lost Peace: The Gazit File”. In June 1973, during Chancellor Willy BrandtWest German chancellor, 1969–1974, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate; visited Israel in June 1973.What they wanted: Close ties with Israel alongside closeness to the Arab states: a “balanced policy”.More on Willy Brandt in “People and events” →’s visit, he briefed the press in English, stressing that Israel had no objection to friendly nations maintaining good relations with the Arab states.
After the visit a secret channel for messages opened between Meir and Brandt, and Gazit ran it: in August 1973 he explained its nature in a letter to Israel’s ambassador in Bonn. Two months later war broke out, and his office became the meeting point between Jerusalem and Washington.
Of the American airlift, the transport planes that brought Israel arms and ammunition in the middle of the war, he later said: “The airlift was decided not because we asked for it.” On the morning of 6 October he left in the middle of the meeting at the Prime Minister’s to arrange her meeting with the American ambassador, Kenneth KeatingUnited States ambassador to Israel, 1973–1975.More on Kenneth Keating in “People and events” →.
It was he who proposed that Israeli and Egyptian officers negotiate face to face, at the Kilometre 101 talks, held at a point on the Cairo–Suez road where officers of the two armies met. He told the story in an interview with the historian Ken SteinAn American historian of the Middle East; interviewed Gazit.More on Ken Stein in “People and events” →.
In December 1973 he coordinated the expert teams ahead of the Geneva Conference, and in January 1974 he worked on the wording of the disengagement agreement with Egypt. On 6 December 1973 he testified before the Agranat Commission and told it: “Every Jew must ask himself where he erred.”
He moved from the lesson to action: on 26 March 1974 he submitted to Golda Meir a memorandum with three annexes: a survey of the National Security Council in the United States, a proposal to set up a national security staff in Israel, and a discussion of how competing intelligence assessments should be confronted.
Such a staff was established in Israel only in 1999. The State Archives hold a file titled “Meetings with the Prime Minister recorded by M. Gazit”, with summaries and minutes from April 1973 to September 1974.
A fork in the road
What reaches the prime minister’s desk, and what stays outside?
Filter and summarise
The price: The risk that something important will not get through.
Pass on everything
The price: A prime minister drowning in information at the moment of truth.
Sources (14)
- Mordechai Gazit’s Testimony before the Agranat Commission Testimony
- Rabin and Ford, 11 June 1975 Diplomatic record
- Middle East Contemporary Survey — Contributor Biography Diplomatic record
- Ken Stein Interview With Mordechai Gazit Testimony
- Mordechai Gazit’s testimony to the Agranat Commission, 6 December 1973 (Hebrew) Diplomatic record
- Israel State Archives — The files in the Yom Kippur War collection (Hebrew) Diplomatic record
- Yoav Gelber — Was the 1973 war inevitable? Book or article
- Rami Rom and Amir Gilat — Kissinger’s secret channel with Egypt (Hebrew) Book or article
- Rom, Gilat & Sheldon — Kissinger’s Lost Peace: The Gazit File Book or article
- JTA — Chancellor Brandt’s visit to Israel Biography
- JTA — A mission to Washington and the end of his term at the Prime Minister’s Office Biography
- Golda Meir’s government before the Yom Kippur War — a reply to Yigal Kipnis (Hebrew) Diplomatic record
- State Archives — Rabin to Foreign Ministry Director-General Gazit, 5 September 1972 Diplomatic record
- State Archives — cables between Rabin and Gazit, 6 September 1972 Diplomatic record
Israel and the world
“Golda’s kitchen”
“Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” →’s kitchen” was the small forum in which Golda Meir shaped the important decisions. On Saturday nights, before the Sunday cabinet meeting, a handful of ministers met at her home: Moshe DayanDefence Minister, 1967–1974, and Foreign Minister, 1977–1979.What they wanted: Defensible borders; and after 1977, as foreign minister, peace with Egypt.More on Moshe Dayan in “People and events” →, Yigal AllonDeputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister in Rabin’s government.What they wanted: Defensible borders, and a territorial compromise with Jordan (the “Allon Plan”).More on Yigal Allon in “People and events” → and Yisrael GaliliMinister without portfolio and one of Golda Meir’s closest advisers.More on Yisrael Galili in “People and events” →, and at times others.
The most sensitive matters were discussed there, among them the secret meetings with King HusseinKing of Jordan, 1952–1999.What they wanted: To keep his kingdom safe between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians, and to regain the West Bank.More on King Hussein in “People and events” →, which were never brought to the full cabinet. Gazit, Director-General of her office and her political adviser, was the professional at the table: he recorded the meetings, prepared the papers and drafted the cables.
The challenge for such a man was to serve the Prime Minister loyally and stay out of the struggles between the ministers.
The secret channel between Cairo and Washington
Hafez IsmailNational security adviser to Egypt’s President Sadat. In 1973 he conducted secret contacts with Kissinger on Sadat’s behalf.More on Hafez Ismail in “People and events” → was the national security adviser of Egypt’s President Anwar SadatPresident of Egypt, 1970–1981.What they wanted: To get Sinai back for Egypt, and move Egypt from Soviet to American patronage.More on Anwar Sadat in “People and events” →. In July 1972 Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt and, through Ismail, opened a direct and secret channel to Henry KissingerU.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.What they wanted: To push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and make the United States the only broker, through step-by-step agreements.More on Henry Kissinger in “People and events” → at the White House. In February 1973 the two met, and Ismail set out Egypt’s readiness for an agreement with Israel, with demilitarised zones and peacekeeping forces.
Israel responded hesitantly, and the contacts did not ripen. Less than five months after their second meeting, in May, the war broke out. Historians have argued ever since: some see these contacts as a missed opportunity for peace, others hold that the war could not have been avoided.
Gazit himself rejected the missed-opportunity claim in his writings; his position is one side of the debate, not an agreed verdict.
More background from the period (3)
The Yom Kippur War
The war began with Egyptian and Syrian attacks on 6 October. Alongside the fighting, efforts to secure assistance and negotiate a ceasefire unfolded in a crisis involving the superpowers.
Explore on WikipediaThe morning of the war: strike first, or absorb the blow
Before dawn Jerusalem learned that Egypt and Syria would open war that day. The Chief of Staff, David Elazar, asked for full mobilisation of the reserves and a pre-emptive air strike.
Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” → approved a broad call-up but decided that Israel would not fire first: she wanted it to be clear to the world, and above all to the United States, who had started the war. She conveyed that decision the same morning to the American ambassador, Kenneth KeatingUnited States ambassador to Israel, 1973–1975.More on Kenneth Keating in “People and events” →.
The challenge for her office in those hours was to mobilise an army and secure Washington’s backing at one and the same time.
Disengagement with Egypt
The agreement of 18 January provided for withdrawals, force limitations and a UN buffer zone near the Suez Canal. It was a step from war towards a sequence of negotiated arrangements.
Explore on Wikipedia