Historical context and questions to explore
London, 1954. A six-year-old state whose neighbours all refuse to recognise it is looking for friends beyond the ring of hostility. The idea, later known as the “periphery doctrine”, was to build ties with states and groups on the edges of the Arab world, such as Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia. Sudan, on the verge of independence, was one of the first directions.
Sudan, under joint British–Egyptian rule, became independent in 1956. The Umma party feared union with Egypt and saw Israel as a possible partner.
Why it mattered. The “periphery doctrine” became, over the following decades, one of the pillars of Israel’s foreign and security policy, from Iran to Ethiopia. Gazit was there, in London, at its very first steps.
A question to think about
How do you open a channel to a country not yet born, with no official relations, without exposing your partners or angering the British?
Why it was hard. The contacts had to stay secret, and Britain, which still ruled Sudan, was not keen on the tie. Inside the Foreign Ministry, too, there were doubts: the partners’ stance might change, the tie might harm the chance of an arrangement with Egypt, and Israel might not be able to help at all.
His part: In London in 1954 Gazit met secretly with Sudanese representatives, in one of Israel’s first attempts to break the isolation around it.
In the mid-1950s Israel looked for ways to break the isolation imposed by its neighbours. One direction was Sudan, then approaching independence, whose leaders feared Egypt’s ambitions to dominate it. Gazit, then first secretary at the Israeli embassy in London, worked on the first phase of the secret contacts with members of Sudan’s Umma party. On 17 June 1954 he and Michael Arnon met Sudanese representatives in London.
As early as March 1954 Gazit approached William Morris, of the Foreign Office’s African Department, for his advice: could the Arab boycott, under which Arab states refused to trade with Israel or with those who traded with it, be broken through Sudan?
He explained that trade ran in one direction, mainly cattle from Sudan to Israel, and that it had almost stopped: from £726,000 in 1950 to just £8,000 in 1953. On 30 June he asked Morris whether the Umma party could keep “their side of the bargain”.
Morris replied that the Sudanese were probably sincere, but it would take courage to act against the Arab world, adding that the Palestine issue was almost as remote to them “as Guatemala”. Years later Gazit told Warburg that the Sudanese leaders had approached him on Morris’s suggestion, since Morris knew he was interested in Sudan.
His reports went largely unanswered. Only later, when General Assaf Simhoni, one of the IDF’s senior commanders, visited the embassy, did he understand that Jerusalem did not want to pursue the matter: it did not want to antagonise Egypt, which regarded Sudan as its “back yard”.
Podeh and Felsenthal’s study, based on Israel State Archives files, adds complexity. In the days after the first meeting, Gazit and Ambassador Eliahu Elath were among the Foreign Ministry officials who had reservations.
Several concerns were raised in the ministry: the party’s stance might change, the tie might harm the prospects of a future arrangement with Egypt, Israel might not be able to help much at all, and it broke the policy of non-intervention in Arab affairs. Still, it was decided to keep exploring.
A cover name was set for the correspondence, “Charles Williams” in London, and the letters were disguised in commercial language. Sudan had formally joined the Arab League in January 1956, but its membership still awaited parliament’s approval.
In May 1956 Gazit wrote that Omar claimed that with financial support he could influence the decision; Gazit estimated the sum needed at £10,000 to £50,000.
The contacts were meant to lay the groundwork for the southern tier of the “Periphery Alliance”, with Ethiopia and Sudan, against Gamal Abdel NasserPresident of Egypt, 1956–1970.More on Gamal Abdel Nasser in “People and events” →’s Egypt. The British Foreign Office was not enthusiastic about an Israeli–Sudanese connection. The tie lasted until Sudan’s 1958 military coup, which ended it. It is an early appearance of something that would accompany Gazit throughout his career: quiet work in unofficial channels.Book or articleElie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal — Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations (1954–1964)Book or articleGabriel Warburg — The Sudan and Israel: An Episode in Bilateral Relations
Sources and reading notes (2)
The lead source
Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal — Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations (1954–1964) ↗Israel Studies 28(2), 2023, pp. 1–28. A study of the two phases of secret contacts between Israel and Sudan, including Gazit’s role as first secretary in London in 1954. On the letter of 11 May 1956 (Israel State Archives, 5573/2): the article’s text names Sharett as recipient and note 27 names Meir, so the site does not name the recipient.
- Books, Articles and Letters[PF1] Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal — Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations (1954–1964) ↗
Israel Studies 28(2), 2023, pp. 1–28. A study of the two phases of secret contacts between Israel and Sudan, including Gazit’s role as first secretary in London in 1954. On the letter of 11 May 1956 (Israel State Archives, 5573/2): the article’s text names Sharett as recipient and note 27 names Meir, so the site does not name the recipient.
- Books, Articles and Letters[WAR92] Gabriel Warburg — The Sudan and Israel: An Episode in Bilateral Relations ↗
Middle Eastern Studies 28(2), 1992, pp. 385–396. Gazit on pp. 389–395; note 24 rests on information Gazit himself gave the author. References to his letter to Morris, 12 March 1954 (UK National Archives, FO 371/108405), Morris’s report of 5 July 1954 (FO 371/108361), and Gazit’s report of 2 July 1954 (Israel State Archives, 42/1, MG/382/50608).