How is an agreement between enemies written?
Two lessons, two primary sources and one activity, all drawn from documents already on the site, and ready to print.
1. The question of the lesson
Historical context and questions to explore
Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, two in the afternoon. Egypt and Syria attack at once, and a country that did not expect war is fighting for its life. Within three weeks the tide will turn: the IDF will cross the canal, encircle the Third Army, one of the two large Egyptian forces that had crossed it, and the superpowers will reach the brink of confrontation.
On 14 October the American airlift began: transport planes flying arms and ammunition to Israel, day after day. On 22 October the Security Council called a ceasefire, but the fighting went on, and on 24 and 25 October the Soviet Union threatened to intervene and the United States raised the alert of its forces, nuclear forces included. On 28 October Israeli and Egyptian officers met at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo–Suez road, and on the 31st Golda MeirPrime Minister, 1969–1974. Gazit headed her office twice: when she was Foreign Minister in the late 1950s, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1973.What they wanted: Security for Israel, and peace through direct negotiation, without a return to the 1967 lines.More on Golda Meir in “People and events” → left for Washington.
Why it mattered. The Yom Kippur War was Israel’s great trauma: more than 2,600 dead and a nation in shock. Yet out of it opened the road to the first agreements with Egypt, and in the end to peace. In the cables that passed through Gazit’s office you can watch that turn happen, day by day.
A question to think about
How do you hold on to the gains on the ground without breaking with Washington, when every cable is read in the shadow of a superpower crisis?
Why it was hard. The encirclement was Israel’s great achievement of the war and its bargaining card. The United States wanted to avoid an Egyptian humiliation and a clash with the Soviets. Israel depended on American arms and support, while at home criticism grew over the failures and the fate of the prisoners.
How does an agreement between enemies get written? After the Yom Kippur War, Israel, Egypt and the United States moved step by step from a ceasefire to a disengagement of forces and then to an interim agreement. Behind every clause stood people who argued over single words. Mordechai Gazit, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, was one of them.
Aims: students will read a declassified memorandum, identify the interests of each side, and see how a principle becomes a clause.
2. Source A — the goal, October 1973
On 19 October 1973, as a ceasefire approached, Gazit set out Israel’s position in a cable to Ambassador Dinitz in Washington (as quoted by the historian Hagai Tsoref, in the site’s translation):
“It is vital in our view that this terrible war should not end merely in a dubious ceasefire. We are striving to enter negotiations and to achieve peace treaties.”
3. Source B — in the negotiating room, March 1975
Three short passages from American memoranda of Kissinger’s talks with the Israeli team in Jerusalem. Read them in order.
Kissinger: On the boycott, he IS prepared to change the boycott. […] But he will let American firms in.
Gazit: On a selective basis.
Sisco: Correct.
Gazit: That is not so good. Not so very good.
Kissinger: Why?
Gazit: Because out of 20, he could admit only two. The blacklist remains.
Rabin: Do we have all the formulations, Gazit?
Gazit: Yes, we have it.
Kissinger: Fahmy said this has to be drafted by Rosenne. I said Gazit could have done it. He said no, Gazit is too sensible; it has to be Rosenne. [Laughter]
Sisco: [to Gazit] You have a real compliment.
Allon: [to Gazit] When you get a compliment from Fahmy, you’d better think again. [Laughter]
Kissinger: The phrase "in the relations between themselves" produced an uproar from Fahmy.
Allon: Wasn’t that in there before?
Gazit: No. Take it out.
Rabin: Let Gazit and Simcha work to prepare ourselves for the Cabinet meeting.
4. Questions for discussion
- In Source A, what does Israel want beyond a ceasefire? Why might it fear a “dubious ceasefire”?
- In Source B, why does Gazit object to a “selective” opening to American firms? What does this teach about the gap between a headline and its practical meaning?
- Why did Egypt’s foreign minister reject a clause drafted by Gazit because he was “too sensible”? What does this reveal about trust between the sides?
- The phrase “in the relations between themselves” was removed. How can two words change the meaning of a commitment?
- These are American records. How might an Israeli or Egyptian record of the same meeting differ?
5. Activity: the drafting room
Divide the class into three delegations: Israel, Egypt and the United States as mediator. Each delegation receives one task: to agree on a single sentence in which both sides undertake not to use force. Israel wants a commitment as close as possible to ending the state of war; Egypt cannot appear to be making a separate peace; the United States needs a text both can sign.
After 20 minutes, compare the classroom sentence with the real outcome: in the interim agreement of September 1975, the parties undertook that the conflict would not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.
6. For the teacher
- All quotations come from sources linked on this site; the Hebrew translations of the American documents are the site’s own.
- The historical assessment of these years is still debated. Encourage students to separate what a document shows from how historians interpret it.
- For a longer unit, add the chapter map of “Public service”, and the “People and events” page for background on the figures.